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Abstract
A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article,
we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals’plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for
exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of
guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals’incentives to take plea bargains caused by these
compensations can be o¤ -set by a small increase in the discounts o¤ ered
for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals
for increasing exoneration compensations, no one has yet noted this desirable separating e¤ ect of exoneree compensations. We argue that such
reforms are likely to achieve this result without causing deterrence losses.
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1

Introduction

One of the objectives of the criminal justice system, famously captured in
“Blackstone’s ratio,”1 is to minimize wrongful convictions.2 Although there
is no consensus on the rate at which the criminal justice system convicts the
innocent,3 the advent of post-conviction DNA testing has provided conclusive
proof that our system does indeed convict the innocent –by both trial and plea
–in non-trivial numbers.4
One obvious, although partial, way to remedy this problem is by o¤ering
wrongful conviction victims post-exoneration compensation. Despite this, at
the time this article is being written, twenty states do not have exoneration
statutes.5 Moreover, even existing statutes are not uniform6 and many are
deemed to be problematic. “Common shortcomings in existing legislation”7
include (i) the limitation of compensation through private compensation bills
only, (ii) the non-compensation of those who are interpreted to have contributed
to their convictions, and (iii) the non-compensation of individuals with felonies
unrelated to the alleged o¤ense for which the individual was wrongfully convicted.8
This situation is troubling for public policy organizations9 as well as academic scholars,10 who have defended exoneree compensations on fairness grounds.
The behavioral and e¢ ciency gains from exoneration compensation have also
been explored to some extent. For instance, the positive potential general11
1 Blackstone

(1765 p. 358).
e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of
the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof [or a procedure for conviction] that
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in
our free society that every individual going about his ordinary a¤airs have con…dence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal o¤ense without convincing a proper fact
…nder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”)
3 For instance, Gross (2008) summarizes the …ndings of previous studies, and states that
"there are two estimates of the false conviction rate for death sentences from 1973 through
1989, and they range from 2.3% to 5%." Prior to this, Justice Scalia had famously greatly
under-estimated the false conviction rate of the American criminal justice system as 0.027%
in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
4 Gross (2008).
See also http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php
for a list of the individuals who were wrongfully convicted through pleas.
5 These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The remaining
thirty states, District of Columbia, and the federal government have compensation statutes.
(http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Compensating_The_Wrongly_Convicted.php.)
6 See, e.g., Norris (2012) reviewing existing state exoneree compensation statutes and …nding that "the assistance o¤ered varies tremendously from state to state". Norris (2011 p.1).
7 http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Compensating_The_Wrongly_Convicted.php
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., the Innocence Project (http://www.innocenceproject.org).
1 0 See, e.g., Armbrust (2004), and the references cited in Mandery et al. (2013 p. 562 note
51).
1 1 Fon and Schäfer (2007).
2 See,
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and speci…c12 deterrence e¤ects of exoneration compensation have been pointed
out in the existing law and economics literature. Unlike previous work, here,
we focus on how exoneree compensation can be used to design mechanisms that
achieve better separation between innocent and guilty individuals in the criminal
justice system through its e¤ect on a seemingly unrelated mechanism, namely
plea-bargaining. As we demonstrate in the remaining parts of this article, our
mechanism reduces the occurrence of wrongful convictions (or equivalently, typeI errors) by incentivizing innocent defendants to refuse plea bargains.
Plea-bargaining is widely believed to contribute to the generation of typeI errors.13 The Innocence Project has identi…ed 29 innocent individuals who
have pled guilty to various crimes, and was thereby able to document nicely the
reasons for why they have done so.14 This project and academic studies reveal
that innocent defendants may plead guilty because, inter alia, they fear even
greater punishment after conviction at trial, they are confused about their own
conduct or the nature of the charges against them (perhaps due to bad legal
advice), the evidence against them appears overwhelming, or pressure from their
attorney (perhaps motivated by the attorney’s desire to avoid the personal costs
of trial). A number of scholars, therefore, have sought ways to encourage the
innocent to go to trial, and, possibly, be acquitted.15 As we demonstrate in this
article, exoneree compensation schemes can also be used to reduce the number
of false convictions caused by plea-bargaining.
The mechanisms that we study rely on the probability of exoneration being
greater for innocent defendants than guilty ones. Due to this probability differential, increasing the compensation to defendants who went to trial increases
the expected pay-o¤ associated with the trial option by a larger amount for
innocent defendants than for guilty defendants. Hence, the number of innocent
defendants taking plea-bargains can be reduced by increasing the amount of
compensation available to defendants who go to trial, without causing much of
a distortion in the incentives of guilty individuals.
Incentive distortions may exist and cause a small increase in the number of
guilty individuals refusing pleas, only if false exoneration is probable. These
increases can be overturned by a small increase in the discount o¤ered through
plea-bargains. Hence, by simultaneously increasing the exoneration compensation and the discounts o¤ered through plea-bargains, one can keep guilty
defendants’plea-bargain incentives constant. The same increases, however, incentivize innocent individuals to refuse plea-bargains more often, because the
increase in the value of going to trial is increased by more than the increase in
the value of taking plea-bargains for innocent defendants.
Our proposal to increase post-trial exoneration compensation should not be
understood as incompatible with the existence of post-plea-bargaining compensation for exonerees. Our main focus throughout this article is the post-trial
compensation of exonerees and its increased separation e¤ect which induces
1 2 Mandery

et al. (2013).
e.g., the numerous references cited in Bowers (2008 p.1119 note 1).
1 4 http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php
1 5 See, e.g., Gazal-Ayal (2006) and Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006).
1 3 See,
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a lower rate of type-I errors. This does not mean that there are not other,
fairness-related, gains that can be achieved by compensating those who have
pleaded guilty to crimes they did not commit. Although we abstract from the
issue of post-plea exoneration in the modeling section of our article, in the discussion section we suggest that post-plea exoneration related considerations are
unlikely to disrupt the functioning of the mechanism that we propose because,
inter alia, the probability of exoneration post-plea is very low, and in addition,
the mechanism requires only that compensation be greater after trial.
Our proposed mechanism adds to the two strands of the law and economics
literature on plea bargaining and exoneration compensation. It complements
previously proposed mechanisms to minimize wrongful convictions caused by
plea-bargaining (Gazal-Ayal (2006) and Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006)), and
is an addition to the sparse literature discussing the bene…cial e¤ects of exoneration compensation (Fon and Schäfer (2007) and Mandery et al. (2013)).
After we propose a plea-bargaining model in section 2 to formalize our proposed mechanism, we discuss, in section 3, how our model interacts with some
of the previous law and economics literature on plea-bargaining and exoneration
compensation. Section 3 also discusses potential e¤ects of our mechanism on
deterrence. We conclude in section 4.

2

Model

We assume that the government possesses an imperfect detection mechanism
that leads to the prosecution of guilty (type G) as well as innocent (type I)
individuals. Prosecuted individuals di¤er in their risk attitudes ( ) and their
utility is represented by U = M , where M represents the monetary equivalent
of an individual’s state and 2 (0; 1). Hence,
< 1 [ > 1] implies riskaversion [a preference for risk] and = 1 implies risk-neutrality. Individuals are
initially endowed with wealth w. The prosecution o¤ers each individual a plea
bargain which discounts the sanction (s) for the underlying o¤ense by s. Hence,
accepting the plea bargain results in a change in the person’s wealth position
of (1
)s. We assume that induces at least some very risk averse innocent
defendants to take the bargain option, since, otherwise, all defendants who take
bargains are guilty, and therefore, there is no type-I error to be mitigated.16 If
the individual rejects the plea bargain, his likelihood of being convicted in court
depends on his type. An innocent individual is convicted with probability 1
whereas a guilty individual is convicted with probability (1
2 ), such that 1
and 2 respectively denote the probability of wrongful conviction (i.e. type-I
errors) and the probability of false acquittal (i.e. type-II errors) through trial,
and 1 > 1 + 2 . We assume that the government can chose between two
general policies: allowing post-conviction exoneration and compensation, and
not. If the government allows post-conviction exoneration, convicts are given an
1 6 Formally, we assume that
is such that inequality (1) below does not (and therefore (2)
does not) hold around = 0. As can be inferred from the proof of Lemma 2, this condition

corresponds to

>

w(1

1 ) (w+

s) 1 1 (w s) 1 (1
s

4

1 ) +s

w

.

opportunity to prove their innocence after being imprisoned. If exonerated, the
government o¤ers an exoneration compensation of to the convicted individual.
We assume that ex-post exoneration happens with a probability of 1 [1
2]
if the person is innocent [guilty], such that 1
and
1
denote
likelihoods
1
2
of erroneous exoneration determinations. Hence, an innocent individual refuses
a plea bargain if:
I( ; )
q
(1

1 )w

+

1 1 (w

+

s) +

1 (1

1 ) (w

s) > w

(1

)s (1)

And, guilty individuals refuse plea bargains if:
G( ; )
q

2w

+ (1

)s
(2)
We express individuals’constraints with reference to I and G as in (1) and
(2) above, because it allows us to separate out the incentive e¤ects of plea bargain discounts, exoneree compensations, and risk attitudes. In particular, I and
G capture the desirability of the trial option as a function of the risk-attitude
and exoneree compensation, whereas the right hand side, namely w (1
)s,
captures the value of plea bargains to defendants. The former of these is affected only by the level of exoneration compensation and risk-attitudes, whereas
the latter is only a¤ected by . Next, we prove that, as expected, risk-loving
defendants …nd the trial option more attractive than risk-averse defendants.
Lemma 1: I > 0, G > 0.
Proof: Let
k1
K1

2 )(1

2 )(w

(1
1 ); k2
w; K2 w +

+

s) + (1

1 1;

k3
s; K3

2 )( 2 ) (w

1 (1

w

s) > w

(1

1 );

s; and f ( )

i2f1;2;3g

ki Ki

(3)

Then, it follows that
1

I = f ( ) ; and, therefore I =

1
2

1

ln(f ( ))f ( ) +

1

f( )

1

1 0

f( )

(4)

Hence, I > 0 i¤
f 0 ( ) > f ( ) ln(f ( ))

(5)

di¤erentiating f , and using the power and product rules of logarithms on both
sides we have:
X
ki ln((Ki )Ki ) > ln(f ( )f ( ) )
(6)
i2f1;2;3g

Next, let, g(x)
I > 0 if

ln(xx ). It follows from the de…nition of g(x) and (6) that
X

ki g(Ki ) > g(

i2f1;2;3g

X

i2f1;2;3g

5

ki Ki )

(7)

But, g(x) is convex, and therefore, due to Jensen’s inequality, the above inequality holds. Hence, I > 0. By following analogous steps one can show that
G > 0, too.
Lemma 1 formalizes the intuitive result that a person is more willing to take
a plea bargain if he is risk-averse. The next lemma builds on this observation.
Lemma 2: (i) For any s > 0 there exist I ( ; ) and G ( ; ), such that
innocent [guilty] individuals take plea bargains if and only if their risk attitudes
are such that < I [ < G ].17 (ii) Moreover, the threshold risk-attitude for
guilty individuals is greater, i.e. G > I .
Proof: (i) Let ki and Ki for i 2 f1; 2; 3g and f ( ) be de…ned as in (3).
Then, it follows from l’Hôpital’s rule that
ki Ki ln(Ki )
d ln(f ( ))
d ln(f ( ))=d
i2f1;2;3g
) = lim(
) = lim(
)
d =d
d
f( )
(8)
Dividing the numerator and the denominator by K1 yields:
lim(ln(I)) = lim(

lim(ln(I)) =
lim(
k1 + k2

K2
K1

K2
K1

k2 ln(K2 )

k1 ln(K1 )

+

K3
K1

+ k3

k1 + k2

+ k3 ln(K3 )
K2
K1

+ k3

K3
K1

K3
K1

) (9)

Hence, lim !1 (ln(I)) = ln(K1 ), which implies that lim !1 I = K1 = w.
The same steps can be used to show that lim !1 (G) = K1 = w. Next, by
manipulating (8) we have that
lim (ln(I)) = lim (
!0

since

i2f1;2;3g

!0

i2f1;2;3g

ki ln(Ki )

i2f1;2;3g

) = lim (

ki

!0 i2f1;2;3g

ki ln(Ki ))

(10)

ki = 1. Hence,
lim I = w(1

1)

!0

(w +

s)

1 1

(w

s)

1 (1

1)

(11)

By using almost identical steps, one can show that
lim G = w 2 (w +
!0

s)(1

2 )(1

2)

(w

(1

s)

2 )( 2 )

(12)

It is assumed, as stated in the …rst paragraph of section 2, that lim !0 I <
w (1
)s for the relevant . Finally, as demonstrated in lemma 1 I ; G > 0.
Hence, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exist j for j 2 fI; Gg
such that G( j ; ) w (1
)s i¤
j . (ii) Moreover, I( ; ) > G( ; )
for all > 0, since 1 > 1 + 2 . To see this, note that per (1) and (2), this
condition holds whenever
(1
1
2 )w >
1 7 We

assume that indi¤erent individuals go to trial.
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[(1

2 )(1

2)

1 1 ] (w

(1

1

2)

1 1 ] (w

+

s) + [(1

2) 2

1 (1

1 )] (w

s)

(13)

s)

(14)

and
[(1

2 )(1

2 )w

(1

+

2 ) (w

1

s) + [(1

+

2) 2

s) >
1 (1

1 )] (w

since
s. That I > 0, G > 0, and I > G for all > 0 together imply that
G > I.
Lemma 2 exploits the observation that innocent individuals are more willing
to go to trial because their probability of being convicted is lower. This implies
that innocent individuals’ threshold risk attitude for refusing plea bargains is
lower than the corresponding threshold for guilty individuals. Proposition 1
below relies on this result to identify exoneration schemes that incentivize innocent individuals to refuse plea-bargains, without a¤ecting guilty individuals’
incentives. For purposes of proposition 1 and 2, it is assumed that the number
of guilty and innocent individuals being prosecuted is …xed. The e¤ects of compensation and plea-bargaining policies on deterrence is considered separately in
section 3.
Proposition 1: If the probability of false exoneration is small, i.e. 2 1,
then for all regimes where
= 0 and
= N > 0, that is, no exoneration
compensation is o¤ ered, one can construct a continuum of new regimes where
= E > 0 and = E > N in which (i) fewer innocent individuals take plea
bargains, i.e. I ( E ; E ) < I (0; N ), and (ii) the number of guilty individuals
taking plea bargains is unchanged, i.e. G ( E ; E ) = G (0; N ).
Proof: Fix N 2 (0; 1). Then, GN
G (0; N ) can be implicitly de…ned
as:
w (1
(15)
N )s = G( GN ; 0)
Hence, the set of ’s and ’s that keep guilty individuals’incentives to take plea
bargains unchanged are given by pairs of ’s and ’s that satisfy:
w

(1

)s = G(

GN ;

)

(16)

Therefore, one can de…ne ( ), the discount rate as a function of
guilty defendants’incentives unchanged, as:
( )=

G(

GN ;

)
s

(w

that keeps

s)

(17)

Hence,
(0) =
When

and

N

>0

= s, by plugging in the expression for G(

(18)
GN ;

) given in (2) we have:

(s) =
p

GN

2w

GN

+ (1

2 )(1

2 )w

GN

s
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+ (1

(19)
2 )( 2 ) (w

s)

GN

(w

s)

Letting

3

2

+ (1

( )=

2 )(1

p

GN

There exists $ 2 (w
Hence,

2 ),

3w

GN

this is equivalent to:

+ (1

3 ) (w

GN

(w

s)

(20)

s

s; w) such that $
p

GN

( )=

s)

$

(w

GN

=

GN

s)

s

3w

=

GN

$

+ (1

(w
s

3 ) (w

s)

s)

GN

.

(21)

Therefore ( ) 2 (0; 1).
Next, note that the critical risk attitude I , which keeps innocent individuals
indi¤erent between taking and refusing plea bargains in regimes that keep guilty
defendants’plea bargain incentives constant (i.e. when the compensation level
is and the discount rate is = ( )), can be de…ned as:
H(

I;

) = I(

I;

)

w + (1

( ))s = 0

(22)

The implicit function theorem can be used to identify how an increase in the
exoneration compensation a¤ects I .
d
d

I

dH=d
=
dH= I

=

I

s

<0

I

(23)

which holds if
(24)

I >s
since I > 0 as proven in lemma 1. Next, recall that
s ( )=
q

GN

2w

(w

s)

hence, s

GN

+ (1

0 since (1
I =

2 )(1

2)
1 1 (w

2 )(w

(25)

+

s)

GN

+ (1

2 )( 2 ) (w

s)

GN

0. Finally, note that
+

s)

I

1

I(

I;

)1

I

>0

(26)

Thus, I is decreasing in .
The intuition behind proposition 1 can be illustrated with reference to …gure
1, below, which represents the relative returns for guilty and innocent individuals
from going to trial (i.e. I and G as de…nes in (1) and (2)), as well as the return
from taking the plea bargain (i.e. w (1 )s). Figure 1 illustrates two schemes,
denoted with superscripts 1 and 2, where the second scheme is generated through
simultaneous increases in and .

8

An increase in the amount of exoneree compensation has a disproportionately
larger impact on the expected return from going to trial for innocent individuals.
In particular, because the probability of post-conviction exoneration for innocent individuals (i.e. 1 ) is much larger than the same for guilty individuals (i.e.
(1
2 )), increasing the amount of exoneree compensation reduces the requisite
risk-tolerance to refuse a plea by a much greater amount for innocent individuals, than for guilty individuals. This observation is re‡ected by a greater shift in
I versus G in …gure 1. Moreover, any increase in the number of guilty individuals
refusing pleas caused by greater exoneration compensations can be overturned
by a small increase in the discount o¤ered through plea-bargains. This is re‡ected in …gure 1 by a shift in the return from the plea option that keeps G
constant. Therefore, simultaneous increases in exoneration compensations and
plea-discounts keep guilty defendants’ plea-bargain incentives unchanged, but
induce more innocent individuals to refuse pleas, i.e. G remains constant while
I is reduced.
The next proposition builds on these observations and identi…es the sanction
scheme that minimizes the number of guilty pleas by innocent individuals.
Proposition 2: Among regimes that keep guilty individuals’ plea bargain
incentives unchanged, that which o¤ ers maximal compensation, i.e. E = s and
(s), (i) maximizes the expected utilities of all defendants, (ii) minimizes
E =
the number of innocent individuals who plead guilty, and (iii) minimizes the
number of wrongful convictions.
Proof: (i) The utility of individuals who take [refuse] plea bargains is increasing in
[ ]. Hence, these utilities are maximized when
and are at
9

their maximal levels. (ii) The number of innocent individuals taking pleas is
increasing I , since individuals with < I take plea bargains. And, as shown
in the proof of proposition 1, I is decreasing in . Therefore, the number of
innocent individuals pleading guilty is decreasing in , and is minimized when
= s. (iii) Individuals who take pleas are convicted with certainty, whereas
trial implies a small probability of wrongful conviction. Therefore, wrongful
convictions are increasing in the number of pleas taken by innocent individuals,
and minimized when = s.
Proposition 2 formalizes the main function of the mechanism that we propose, namely the reduction of wrongful convictions through the use of exoneration compensation. Because the number of wrongful convictions is declining in
the amount of compensation, o¤ering the highest exoneration compensation possible minimizes the number of wrongful convictions. One may question whether
this comes at the cost of reduced deterrence. In the next section, we argue that
our mechanism a¤ects deterrence most likely in a positive manner, if at all.

3
3.1

Discussion
Deterrence E¤ects

In the previous section, we have demonstrated how one may reduce the number of wrongful convictions by simultaneously increasing the amount of exoneree
compensation and the discount for plea-bargaining. However, as stated in proposition 2, this scheme increases the expected utility of guilty defendants. Initially
it may seem that this would signi…cantly reduce deterrence, since the expected
cost associated with the commission of a crime is lowered. This conjecture is
incorrect for three reasons.
First, as discussed in the existing literature, the probability of false exoneration is most likely very low. As Gross (2008 p. 175) states:18
Some exonerated defendants are no doubt guilty of the crimes for
which they were convicted, in whole or in part, but the number
is likely very small. It is extremely di¢ cult to obtain this sort of
relief after a criminal conviction in America, and it usually takes
overwhelming evidence.
Therefore, any increase in guilty individuals’expected utility from going to
trial is quite small. This also implies that the simultaneous increase in the pleadiscount necessary to keep guilty individuals plea-incentives constant is minimal.
1 8 Citing (Gross et al. 2005). See also Fon and Schäfer (2007 p. 278 note 21): "For
convenience, we assume that only the wrongfully convicted has a chance of getting a retrial.
This is justi…ed on the grounds that usually a (successful) retrial is only possible if substantial
new evidence in favor of the convicted shows up. This is unlikely if the criminal was rightfully
convicted" and Gazal-Ayal and Tor (2012 p. 351): "To overcome the challenge of identifying
truly innocent defendants, we turned to the one group whose innocence is nearly certain:
defendants who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated."
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Hence, the reduction in the expected cost associated with committing crime is
most likely very small.
Second, as Fon and Schäfer (2007) demonstrate, exoneree compensation can
increase deterrence by reducing the cost of refraining from crime and thereby
mitigating the negative e¤ect of type-I errors on deterrence. Although recent
research demonstrates that the e¤ect of type-I errors on deterrence is not entirely
clear,19 Fon and Schäfer’s (2007) main point remains valid: any deterrence e¤ect
due to type-I error is mitigated by exoneree compensations.
Third, as we discuss below, large exoneree compensations are likely to incentivize prosecutors to channel their e¤orts towards prosecuting strong cases.20
This is likely to cause more prosecutions of truly guilty individuals and fewer
prosecutions of truly innocent individuals. Hence, deterrence is likely to be
enhanced by an increase in the probability of conviction for guilty individuals.
These three observations reveal that the deterrent e¤ect of our mechanism
is far from being clearly negative. In fact, because the increases in the utility
from crime are very small, our mechanism likely enhances deterrence through
the two aforementioned reductions in type-I and type-II errors.

3.2

’Selection of Cases’E¤ect

Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006) focus on the budget constraint of prosecutors to
identify what they term the ‘selection of cases’e¤ect of "restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain".21 They observe that if prosecutors
cannot o¤er substantial discounts in return for a guilty plea, defendants in weak
cases will not be willing to plea bargain. As a result, a prosecutor who is pressured by budget constraints will have an incentive not to charge defendants
when the probability of conviction is low, and hence the defendant is unlikely to
accept a plea bargain o¤er. Therefore, prosecutors have no credible threats of
pursuing cases against defendants for whom the probability of being convicted
in trial is low. Hence, prosecutors have to substitute potentially weak cases with
strong cases ex-ante to better administer their resources and to secure a high
success rate.
This selection of cases e¤ect identi…ed by Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006) is
generated by exoneree compensations as well. The primary e¤ect of exoneree
compensation is to reduce the expected cost of going to trial, relative to taking
plea-bargains, for the innocent, and thereby increasing the number of innocent
individuals who are willing to go to trial when prosecuted. Prosecutors who
know that they do not have credible threats against such defendants are unlikely
to bring cases against them in the …rst place.
These selection e¤ects are likely to increase the value of post-conviction
exoneration compensation further through two interrelated channels. First, because fewer innocent individuals will be prosecuted, the number of type-I errors
1 9 See Lando (2006), Garoupa and Rizzolli (2012), and Lando and Mungan (2014), for the
existing debate on the e¤ects of type-I errors on deterrence.
2 0 As we discuss below this point is due to Bar-Gill and Oren Gazal-Ayal (2006).
2 1 Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006 p. 353).

11

is likely to be reduced. Second, deterrence will be increased, because prosecutors will be devoting more resources for the prosecution of the truly guilty,
they will thereby be increasing the sensitivity, in a statistical sense, of the law
enforcement system.

3.3

Post-plea Exoneration Compensations

In section II, we demonstrated how one can achieve better separation between
innocent and guilty individuals in the plea-bargaining stage by increasing the
post-trial compensation made available to exonerees, and did not consider postplea-bargaining exoneration compensation. We would like to clarify that we are
not suggesting that post-plea compensation may not have a function or a value.
In general, such compensation may carry fairness related bene…ts, and perhaps
some administrative costs caused by an increased number of exoneration proceedings initiated by guilty individuals. Our objective in this sub-section is not
to debate the normative desirability of having post-plea exoneree compensations, but to demonstrate that the utility of our mechanism is una¤ected by
considerations related to such compensations.
First, and perhaps most importantly, our mechanism is independent of the
availability of the existence of post-plea compensations. The two types of compensation are conceptually separable, as demonstrated by the split among the
30 states that have some form of exoneration statute; currently, post-plea compensation is either completely22 or partially23 unavailable in the District of
Columbia and 12 states out of the 30 states24 with exoneration statutes, whereas
the remaining states do not place conditions based on whether the exoneree has
plead guilty. Hence, independent of the level of post-plea compensation available, post-trial compensation can be increased simultaneously with plea-bargain
discounts, as speci…ed in section II, to achieve better separation between innocent and guilty individuals.
Despite the conceptual separability of post-plea and post-trial compensation
mechanisms, one may wonder whether simultaneous increases in the amount
made available through the two compensations is likely to induce the type of
separation we discussed in section II. The answer is de…nitely ’yes’, if one is
willing to increase post-trial compensations by more than post-plea compensations. In order to achieve the type of separation considered in our model, all
that needs to be achieved is an increase in the innocent individuals’ expected
utility of going to trial that is greater than the increase in their expected utility of pleading guilty. This can easily be achieved by increasing the post-trial
compensation by more than the post-plea compensation for exonerees.
2 2 E.g., Iowa Code Ann. §663A.1, 51, NJ Stat Ann §§ 52:4C-1 to 4C-7, Okl. St. § 154, and
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2305.02 & § 2743.48 require that the person did not plead guilty.
2 3 For instance, the Nebraska statute, NE ST 29-4601, et seq., hinders compensation for
those who have plead guilty unless the guilty plea was coerced by law enforcers.
2 4 These states are: California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin (2014 Compensation Chart, Innocence Project Internal Document )
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Finally, even if one only focuses on compensation schemes that o¤er equal
amounts of compensation to those who have pleaded guilty and those who have
been wrongfully convicted through trial, empirical considerations suggest that
increases in compensation will have a larger e¤ect on the expected utility of the
trial option of innocent individuals. Three empirical considerations are relevant.
First, a person who has pleaded guilty in the past is likely to lose credibility
in exoneration proceedings. Therefore, given heightened requirements in exoneration proceedings, the probability of a post-plea exoneration is much smaller
than the probability of a post-trial exoneration. As Dan Simon states: "Overturning a conviction is close to impossible for inmates who were convicted based
upon their pleas."25 Second, recent scholarship has demonstrated an ’innocence
e¤ect’in plea-bargaining (Gazal-Ayal and Tor (2012) and Tor, Gazal-Ayal and
Garcia (2010)): "innocents are less willing to accept plea o¤ers than guilty defendants".26 One plausible cause for this e¤ect is innocent individuals discounting
the di¤erence between the expected utility associated with the plea option and
being convicted in trial. This implies that an increase in the expected value
of trial due to increased exoneree compensation is likely to be valued more in
comparison to similar increases associated with the expected value of pleading
guilty. Third, because individuals who have pleaded guilty have less to gain
from being exonerated in comparison to people convicted through trial, they
are less likely to initiate exoneration proceedings.
These three observations imply that an increase in post-trial compensation
is likely to increase the expected utility of the trial option by more than the
increase in the expected utility associated with pleading guilty due to similar
increases in the post-plea exoneration compensation. Therefore, the separating
function identi…ed in our model can be obtained even in cases where the posttrial and post-plea compensations are constrained to be equal.

4

Conclusion

Policy organizations and scholars, most notably the Innocence Project, are urging states to adopt statutes that either enable exonerations, or increase the
amount of compensation available to exonerees. Although there are many fairness related e¤ects associated with these proposed statutory reforms, the wrongful conviction reducing aspect of increased exoneration compensations has been
unnoticed or over-looked. In this article we have proposed a mechanism that relies on large exoneree compensations that reduces wrongful convictions without
a¤ecting guilty individuals’incentives and that is unlikely to a¤ect deterrence.
Accordingly, our analysis adds another item, in the form of reduced wrongful convictions, to the list of bene…ts that are associated with large exoneree
compensations.
2 5 Simon
2 6 Tor,

(2012 p. 227-228) n. 17.
Gazal-Ayal and Garcia (2010 p. 97).
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